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Abstract—Caching popular contents at mobile devices, assisted
by device-to-device (D2D) communications, is considered as a
promising technique for mobile content delivery. It can effectively
reduce backhaul traffic and service cost, as well as improving
the spectrum efficiency. However, due to the selfishness of mobile
users, incentive mechanisms will be needed to motivate device
caching. In this paper, we investigate incentive mechanism design
in cache-assisted D2D networks, taking advantage of the user
mobility information. An inter-contact model is adopted to
capture the average time between two consecutive contacts of
each device pair. A Stackelberg game is formulated, where each
user plays as a follower aiming at maximizing its own utility
and the mobile network operator (MNO) plays as a leader
aiming at minimizing the cost. Assuming that user responses
can be predicted by the MNO, a cost minimization problem is
formulated. Since this problem is NP-hard, we reformulate it as
a non-negative submodular maximization problem and develop
a ( 1
4+
)-approximation local search algorithm to solve it. In
the simulation, we demonstrate that the local search algorithm
provides near optimal performance. By comparing with other
caching strategies, we validate the effectiveness of the proposed
incentive-based mobility-aware caching strategy.
I. INTRODUCTION
To accommodate the exponentially growing mobile data
traffic, especially the mobile video, wireless caching recently
attracts lots of attentions [1]. By prefetching popular contents
at wireless edges, i.e., local access points and mobile devices,
mobile users can be served locally without connecting to
the core network [2]. Accordingly, wireless caching is a
promising technique to alleviate the backhaul burden, as well
as lowering delays and service cost. Different from caching in
wired networks, wireless caching enjoys a unique feature, i.e.,
the users are mobile. Recently, the user mobility information
has been exploited to improve wireless caching. A general
framework to design mobility-aware caching strategies was
introduced in [3], along with a detailed discussion of different
mobility models. Modeling the user mobility by a Markov
chain model, a femto-caching strategy was proposed in [1].
Taking the advantage of the temporal correlation of the user
mobility, a mobility-aware caching strategy at user devices
was proposed in [4].
Compared with the femto-caching systems, caching at user
devices can facilitate device-to-device (D2D) communica-
tions. The user requests may be served via proximate D2D
links without going through the base station (BS), which
This work was supported by the Hong Kong Research Grants Council
under Grant No. 610113.
can significantly improve the spectrum efficiency and reduce
the backhaul burden. However, there exists a new challenge
in D2D caching networks. That is, considering the selfish
nature of the mobile users, BSs cannot fully control the
caching strategy at user devices. Thus, incentive mechanisms
are needed to motivate the users to cache.
To resolve the selfish issue in caching networks, some
efforts have been made. In [5], an incentive mechanism is
designed to motivate caching at resident subscribers in an
ad hoc network. Considering a peer-to-peer (P2P) system, an
incentive scheme was proposed in [6], which rewards the peers
based on the popularity of contents. However, different from
conventional P2P systems, the topology of the D2D cache
network is not fixed due to the user mobility. A recent work [7]
considered a D2D caching network and proposed an incentive
mechanism based on a Stackelberg game, which unfortunately
ignored the user mobility. Moreover, another crucial issue
in previous studies on incentive mechanism in D2D caching
networks is the high overhead incurred by collecting global
information at each user device.
In this paper, we investigate the incentive mechanism design
in cache-assisted D2D networks, while considering the user
mobility. To take advantage of the user mobility pattern, an
inter-contact model is considered, where the timeline of each
pair of devices consists of contact times and inter-contact
times. A pair of user devices are in contact when they are
within the transmission range. Then, the contact times are the
times when two users are in contact, while the inter-contact
times are the times between two consecutive contact times.
Considering the selfish nature of the mobile users, the mobile
network operator (MNO) should provide some incentives to
motivate device caching. A Stackelberg game is formulated,
where each user plays as a follower aiming at maximizing
its utility by controlling its own cache storage, and the
MNO plays as a leader aiming at minimizing the overall
cost, including the service cost and the payment to users,
by controlling the caching placement and unit payment to
each user. Assuming that the MNO can predict the responses
of the users, a cost minimization problem is formulated,
which is an NP-hard problem. By reformulating the problem
into a non-negative submodular maximization problem over
a matroid constraint, a local search algorithm is developed,
which achieves
(
1
4+
)
-approximation with polynomial run-
time. Simulation results show that the local search algorithm
provides near-to-optimal performance. Meanwhile, we also
ar
X
iv
:1
70
5.
03
42
9v
1 
 [c
s.I
T]
  9
 M
ay
 20
17
user 3
user 2
user 1
user 2
user 3
user 1
MNO)
Payment to the users
Service cost
Mobile user
Caching content
Transmission link
Requested file
Moving path
Fig. 1. An illustration of the cache-assisted D2D network.
demonstrate that the incentive-based mobility-aware caching
strategy efficiently offloads the cellular traffic to D2D links
and reduces the overall cost.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. User Mobility Model
As shown in Fig. 1, we consider an MNO, which provides
wireless service to mobile users in a macro cell through a
macro cell BS (MBS). There are Nu users in the cell, whose
index set is denoted as D = {1, 2, ..., Nu}. A widely used
inter-contact model is adopted to capture the user mobility
pattern, where the timeline of each user pair is divided
into contact times and inter-contact times. The contact times
denote the times when two mobile users are within the trans-
mission range and are thus able to exchange data, while the
inter-contact times denote the times between two consecutive
contact times. As commonly assumed [8], the arrival of the
contact times between user i ∈ D and j ∈ D is modeled as
a Poisson process with intensity λi,j , and λi,i is regarded as
+∞. Meanwhile, the timelines between different user pairs
are assumed to be independent.
B. Caching and File Delivery Model
A library with Nf files is considered, whose index set
is denoted as F = {1, 2, ..., Nf}. The size of each file is
assumed to be s bytes, while the available storage of user
i ∈ D is ci bytes. Each file is assumed to be either fully
cached or not stored at all at each user device. Specifically,
xi,f = 1, where i ∈ D and f ∈ F , means file f is cached at
user i; otherwise, xi,f = 0. File f ∈ F is requested by user
i ∈ D with probability pri,f , where
∑
f∈F p
r
i,f = 1. A user
i ∈ D requesting file f ∈ F can be served via D2D links
if it caches file f or encounters other users who cache file
f within a certain delay time after the request is generated,
denoted as T d. Otherwise, it will be served by the MNO
through a cellular link. Offloading user requests to D2D links
can reduce the cellular load, and thus, lower the service cost.
Meanwhile, it can also facilitate D2D links and improve the
spectrum efficiency. An example is shown in Fig. 1. In this
case, user 1 requests a file, and it encounters user 3 caching
the requested file within the delay time. Then, it is served by
user 3 via a D2D link. However, user 2 does not encounter
a user caching its requested file, and thus, it is served via a
cellular link.
C. Pricing Model
The utility of user i using wi proportion of its available
storage for its own needs, e.g., taking pictures and down-
loading apps, is denoted as uci (wi). According to the law of
diminishing returns, the same as [9], we consider the utility
uci (wi) as a logarithm function given as
uci (wi) = ai ln(biwi), (1)
where ai and bi are parameters for characterizing the user
utility. The cost of user i for using vi bytes for caching is
assumed to be linear of vi, and the unit cost is ρi. Meanwhile,
if user i shares vi bytes for caching, the MNO will pay rivi
for it, where ri is the unit payment.
III. INCENTIVE MECHANISM DESIGN
In this section, a Stackelberg game will be formulated. In
a Stackelberg game, a leader and several followers compete
sequentially on certain recourses. The leader goes first, and
then the followers make decisions based on the choice of
the leader [10]. In this paper, to offload traffic to D2D links
and reduce the service cost, the MNO provides payment to
the mobile users to motivate device caching. Accordingly, the
MNO plays as a leader aiming at minimizing the overall cost,
including the service cost and the payment. Considering the
selfish nature, each mobile user plays as a follower aiming
at maximizing its own utility. Due to the high overhead, it is
impractical for each user to acquire the global information,
including the pairwise mobility information and the caching
placement at other user devices. Thus, we assume that the
MNO designs the caching placement and determines the
payment based on the global information. Meanwhile, each
user determines its cache storage based on its own local
information.
A. User Subgame
The users are regarded as the followers in the Stackelberg
game. The overall utility of user i ∈ D includes the utility of
the storage for its own needs, the cost for caching, and the
payment from the MNO, given as Ui(vi) = uci
(
1− vici
)
−
ρivi+ rivi. Each user aims at maximizing its own utility, and
thus, the user subgame is
v?i = arg max
vi∈[0,ci]
Ui(vi), (2)
where i ∈ D. By finding the stationary point, we can get the
optimal cache storage for user i ∈ D as
v?i =
{
ci − airi−ρi if ri > ρi,
0 if ri ≤ ρi.
(3)
B. Cost Minimization Problem
The MNO is regarded as the leader in the Stackelberg
game. The overall cost of the MNO includes the cost to serve
the mobile users via cellular links and the payment to the
users. According to [11], we assume that the service cost
is a function of the proportion of requested files served via
cellular links, denoted as Q(P c), where P c is the proportion
of requested files served via cellular links and Q(·) is assumed
to be an increasing convex function. In the following, we will
first find an expression for P c.
Let T ei,j , where i, j ∈ D, denote the time between user
i requesting a file and user i encountering user j, and then
the delay time of user i when requesting file f is given as
Di,f = min
j∈D and xj,f=1
T ei,j . Based on the memoryless property
of the Poisson process, T ei,j follows an exponential distribu-
tion with parameter λi,j . Since the inter-contact times for
different pairs of users are assumed to be independent, Di,f
is an exponential distributed random variable with parameter
Λi,f =
∑
j∈D and xj,f=1
λi,j =
∑
j∈D
xj,fλi,j . Since user i can
get the requested file via D2D links when it stores the file
in its own cache or the delay time is within time T d, the
probability that this user needs to download the requested file
via a cellular link is Pi =
∑
f∈F
pf exp
(
− ∑
j∈D
xj,fT
dλi,j
)
.
Thus, the proportion of requested files served via cellular links
is given as P c = 1Nu
∑
i∈D
Pi. Then, the cost minimization
problem for the MNO is
min
xi,f ,ri
Q(P c) +
∑
i∈D
rivi, (4)
s.t. s
∑
f∈F
xi,f ≤ vi, i ∈ D and xi,f ∈ {0, 1}, (4a)
where constraint (4a) implies the limited cache storage. As-
suming that the utility function of the storage for its own
needs and the unit caching cost is stable in a period, the
MNO can use learning algorithms, e.g., regression analysis
[12], to estimate the parameters ai, bi, ρi and ci, where
i ∈ D. Accordingly, the MNO can predict the responses of the
mobile users. Specifically, if the MNO needs cache storage as
vi ∈ [0, ci] bytes of user i, the unit payment to user i should
be
ri =
ai
ci − vi + ρi, (5)
and thus the payment to user i is
CPi (vi) =
(
ai
ci − vi + ρi
)
vi. (6)
Since the required cache storage of user i ∈ D is s ∑
f∈F
xi,f ,
the cost minimization problem considering the response of
each user is
min
xi,f
Q(P c) +
∑
i∈D
CPi
s∑
f∈F
xi,f
 , (7)
s.t. s
∑
f∈F
xi,f ≤ ci, i ∈ D and xi,f ∈ {0, 1}. (7a)
Considering that problem (7) is an NP-hard problem, in the
following, we will provide an effective sub-optimal algorithm
to solve it.
IV. MOBILITY-AWARE CACHING STRATEGY
In this section, we first reformulate the cost minimization
problem as a non-negative submodular maximization problem
over a matroid constraint. Then, a local search algorithm
is adopted to solve the problem, which achieves a
(
1
4+
)
-
approximation.
A. Problem Reformulation
Submodular maximization problems belong to an important
kind of combinational optimization problems, which have
been widely investigated [13], [14]. Some recent works de-
veloped caching strategies based on submodular maximization
over a matroid constraint [4], [15].
We use yj,f , where j ∈ D and f ∈ F , to denote that
file f is cached at user j, and define the ground set as S =
{yj,f |j ∈ D and f ∈ F}. Then, each caching placement can
be represented as a subset of S. Specifically, for a caching
placement set A ⊆ S, the element yj,f ∈ A means that user
j caches file f , i.e., xj,f = 1, while yj,f /∈ A means that user
j does not cache file f , i.e., xj,f = 0. Denote Si = {yi,f |f ∈
F}, which contains all the files that may be cached at user
i, and then the constraint (7a) can be rewritten as a matroid
constraint, as shown in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1. Let cni = max
(
0,
⌈
ci
s − 1
⌉)
, where i ∈ D.
Constraint (7a) can be rewritten as a matroid constraint, i.e.,
Y ∈ I, where
I = {A ⊆ S∣∣|A ∩ Si| ≤ cni ,∀i ∈ D} . (8)
Proof. Based on Eq. (5), if the required cache storage of user
i ∈ D equals ci, i.e., s
∑
f∈F
xi,f = ci, the payment to user
i goes to ∞. Since the objective is to minimize the overall
cost, it is impossible to have s
∑
f∈F
xi,f = ci, which also fits
the practical scenario that the mobile user does not share all
the available storage for caching. Considering that the number
of files cached at user i is an integer, constraint (7a) can be
rewritten as (8). Then, the tuple M = (S, I) is a kind of
typical matroids, i,e., the partition matroid [16].
Then, the cost minimization problem (7) is equivalent to
the following maximization problem
max
Y ∈I
g(Y ) = θ −Q (P c(Y ))−
∑
i∈D
CAi (|Y ∩ Si|), (9)
where the proportion of requested files served via cellular links
is rewritten as a set function, given as
P c(Y ) =
1
Nu
∑
i∈D
∑
f∈F
pf exp
− ∑
j∈D,yj,f∈Y
T dλi,j
 ,
(10)
the payment to user i ∈ D is rewritten as
CAi (|Y ∩ Si|) =
CPi (s|Y ∩ Si|) if |Y ∩ Si| ≤ cni ,[
CPi (sc
n
i )− CPi (s ·max(0, cni − 1))
]
if |Y ∩ Si| > cni ,× (|Y ∩ Si| − cni ) + CPi (scni )
(11)
and θ = Q(1) +
∑
i∈D
CAi (Nf ) is a constant to guarantee
that g(Y ) is a non-negative function. Note that, rewriting the
payment as in (11) is to cover the domain of the ground set
S, including the subsets of S which is not in I. Then, Lemma
2 proves the submodularity of g(Y ) in (9).
Lemma 2. The objective function in (9), i.e., g(Y ), is a non-
negative submodular set function.
Proof. Due to space limitation, the proof is omitted.
Based on Lemmas 1 and 2, problem (9) is to maximize a
non-negative submodular function over a matroid constraint.
B. Local Search Algorithm
To solve a non-negative submodular maximization problem
over a matroid constraint, the local search algorithm provides
a sub-optimal solution, which is at least
(
1
4+
)
of the optimal
solution [14]. Fractional local search algorithms can provide
solutions with higher approximation ratios. However, consid-
ering that the size of the ground set is (NuNf ), the fractional
local search algorithms are impractical due to the high com-
putation complexity. Furthermore, in the simulation, we will
show that the performance of the local search algorithm is
close to that of the optimal one.
Algorithm 1 The Local Search Procedure
Input: (V, I, g) including a set V , a matroid constraint I, a
non-negative submodular set function g(Y )
Output: A solution Y ? corresponding to arg max
Y ∈I,Y⊆V
g(Y )
1: Select yj?,f? = arg max{yj,f}∈I and yj,f∈V
g({yj,f}) and set
Y = {yj?,f?}.
2: while any of the following local improvements applies
do
3: Add operation:
4: if ∃yj,f ∈ V \Y such that Y ∪ {yj,f} ∈ I and
g (Y ∪ {yj,f}) ≥
(
1 + 
N4uN
4
f
)
g (Y ) then
5: Set Y = Y ∪ {yj,f}.
6: end if
7: Delete operation:
8: if ∃yj,f ∈ Y such that g (Y \{yj,f}) ≥(
1 + 
N4uN
4
f
)
g (Y ) then
9: Set Y = Y \{yj,f}.
10: end if
11: Swap operation:
12: if ∃yj,f ∈ V \Y and yj′,f ′ ∈ Y such that
Y \{yj′,f ′}∪{yj,f} ∈ I and g (Y \{yj′,f ′} ∪ {yj,f}) ≥(
1 + 
N4uN
4
f
)
g (Y ) then
13: Set Y = Y \{yj′,f ′} ∪ {yj,f}.
14: end if
15: end while
As listed in Algorithm 1, the local search procedure finds
a solution of problem (9) on a set, i.e., V . There are three
local improvement operations, including adding an element,
deleting an element and swapping a pair of elements. The
procedure starts with selecting an element yj,f ∈ V which
maximizes g({yj,f}) subjecting to {yj,f} ∈ I, denoted as
Algorithm 2 The Local Search Algorithm
Input: (S, I, g) including a ground set S, a matroid con-
straint I, a non-negative submodular function g(Y ).
Output: A solution Y ? corresponding to arg max
Y ∈I,Y⊆S
g(Y )
1: Set V1 = S.
2: for i = 1, 2 do
3: Apply the Algorithm 1 with input (Vi, I, g) and get the
output solution Y ?i .
4: Set Vi+1 = Vi\Y ?i .
5: end for
6: Return the solution Y ? = arg max (g(Y ?1 ), g(Y
?
2 )).
yj?,f? , and initializes the solution set as Y = {yj?,f?}. Then,
the solution is improved via the three operations, until none of
them can improve the objective value by more than 
N4uN
4
f
. The
local search algorithm in Algorithm 2 is a
(
1
4+
)
-approximate
algorithm of problem (9). It first applies Algorithm 1 on the
ground set S and gets a corresponding solution Y ?1 . Then,
Algorithm 1 is applied on the set S\Y ?1 and a corresponding
solution Y ?2 is obtained. Finally, the approximate solution Y
?
is obtained as the optimal one of Y ?1 and Y
?
2 . It is proved
in [14] that, if 1 is no more than a polynomial of (NuNf ),
Algorithm 1 can run in polynomial time.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we provide simulation results to validate the
effectiveness of the local search algorithm and the incentive-
based mobility-aware caching strategy. The following four
strategies are compared:
1) Optimal mobility-aware caching strategy: it applies the
optimal solution of problem (7) obtained by a dynamic
programming (DP) algorithm. The details of the algo-
rithm are omitted due to space limitation.
2) Sub-optimal mobility-aware caching strategy: it applies
the sub-optimal solution of problem (7) obtained by the
local search algorithm in Section IV, where  = 0.01.
3) Popular caching strategy: each user caches the most
popular files.
4) Random caching strategy: the probability of each user to
cache a particular file is proportional to the file request
probability.
In both the popular and random caching strategies, the cache
storage of each mobile user is assumed to be the same, and
the optimal cache storage is obtained by line search. The file
request probability follows a Zipf distribution with parameter
γr, i.e., pri,f =
f−γr∑
k∈F
k−γr , i ∈ D. The requests are more
concentrated on the popular files with a larger γr. We assume
the service cost function Q(·) to be a linear function, the slop
of which is set as 0.01 $/MB based on the charges of AT&T’s
and Verizon’s plans [17]. The size of each file is assumed
to be 200 MB, and each user requests one file per day on
average. Thus, we have Q(P c) = 0.01× 200NuP c, denoting
the service cost per day. The overall cost is normalized by
the service cost without caching, i.e., Q(1). The available
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storage of each user is assumed to be 1 GB. Meanwhile,
the parameters ρi, bi and ai, i ∈ D, are set as 0, 100 and
0.015/ ln(100) $1, respectively.
In Fig. 2, the inter-contact parameters λi,j , where i ∈ D and
j ∈ D\{i}, are generated according to a Gamma distribution,
i.e., Γ(4.43, 1/1088) [18]. By comparing the optimal and sub-
optimal mobility-aware caching strategies, we see that the
local search algorithm provides near optimal performance.
Moreover, the mobility-aware caching strategies outperform
both popular and random caching strategies, since the latter
ones do not make good use of the user mobility information
and the prediction of user response.
Next we use a real-life data set collected by Chaintreau
et. al. in [8] to evaluate the performance of the proposed
incentive-based mobility-aware caching strategy. In this data
set, the contact times among 78 participants are recorded.
Same as [4], we estimate the parameters λi,j by the average
contact rates during the daytime of the first day and design the
caching strategies. The performance in the second daytime is
1According to Google Drive, the price of online storage is 1.99 $ per
month for 100 GB. The price of the storage hardware on the mobile phone
is roughly 20 times higher than that of the online HDD storage, which is
estimated by the storage price of iPhone and the price of HDD on Amazon.
The price of the storage on the mobile phones is therefore approximately
0.015 $/GB per day. Assuming bi = 100 and uci (1) = 0.015 $, we can get
the value of ai based on Eq. (1).
shown in Fig. 3. It is shown that the proposed mobility-aware
caching strategy can better reduce the overall cost than the
popular and random caching strategies.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we designed an incentive mechanism for a
D2D caching network while taking advantage of the user
mobility pattern. A Stackelberg game was formulated, where
each user plays as a follower and the MNO plays as the
leader. We developed an effective local search algorithm to
solve the cost minimization problem at the MNO. Simulation
results showed that the local search algorithm provides near
optimal performance and also validated the effectiveness of
the proposed incentive-based mobility-aware caching strategy.
For future works, it would be interesting to develop online
caching update strategies considering time-varying user pref-
erences and utilities.
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